When Hassan II Told the Americans: “Spain Is Stronger”

The disclosure dates back to July 11, 1975. That day, in Marrakech, Hassan II received William Clements, then the American deputy secretary of Defense. According to the official account of the meeting, the discussion focused in particular on Morocco’s military needs, Algeria and the future of the Sahara, then administered by Madrid.

The king assured him that neither Morocco nor Spain wanted war. If Madrid left the Sahara, Rabat would nevertheless not allow a vacuum to emerge and would fight any independence movement, but not the Spanish army. Hassan II then explained, smiling according to the American transcript, that Spain was militarily stronger and that the two countries were condemned to live as neighbors.

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This private position, expressed less than four months before the Green March, contrasts with later accounts of a Hassan II ready to directly commit Morocco to a war against Spain. The monarch nevertheless anticipated possible border incidents, which he presented as political operations intended to influence public opinion.

The conversation also revealed his dissatisfaction with Washington. Lacking sufficient spare parts and ammunition, Moroccan officers, he said, had the impression that he had chosen the wrong weapons supplier. Hassan II therefore called for accelerated deliveries and tanks equipped with the most recent systems. He even asked that the origin of certain armored vehicles taken directly from U.S. Army stocks remain secret from the FAR.

An Offer of Bases to the Pentagon

This meeting confirmed an even more sensitive proposal, conveyed six months earlier by Ahmed Dlimi. On January 27, 1975, the Moroccan intelligence chief had met with several senior Pentagon officials in Washington. According to the secret memorandum of that meeting, Hassan II had authorized him to offer the United States future bases for its air force and navy in Morocco.

The American response was favorable. William Clements considered the offer particularly useful, as Washington’s negotiations over its bases in Spain could encounter difficulties. Dlimi also mentioned the obsolescence of Moroccan equipment, Soviet influence in Algeria and the fear that the latter might seek direct access to the Atlantic.

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Morocco was then asking for all its American equipment to be delivered within thirty-six months. In particular, it wanted to obtain M60 tanks rather than rebuilt M48s, as well as a rapid response regarding TOW anti-tank missiles. The document does not, however, make it possible to assert that the bases were offered in exchange for these weapons: the two matters were discussed simultaneously, without a formal quid pro quo.

On July 11, Hassan II personally renewed this opening. Once the Middle East conflict had been settled, he explained, nothing would prevent Morocco from offering the United States bases capable of compensating for possible American difficulties with Portugal or Spain.